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This reply brief for Appellant The Doctors Company ("TDC") responds to the 
brief of appellee Judd ("Judd Br.") and to the brief of appellee Drezga ("Drezga Br."). 
REPLY TO APPELLEES9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees Judd and Drezga have partially stated the case. A more complete 
account of the trial court proceedings appears in TDC's opening brief (p. 5-7). 
REPLY TO APPELLEES9 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Judd's Factual Statements 
Some of the facts offered by Judd can be clarified. For example, Judd recites that 
following the malpractice verdict against Drezga in December 2000, "TDC, through 
appointed counsel," appealed. (Judd Br. p. 4 ^ 13; italics added.) Actually, TDC's 
retained counsel (Mr. Slagle) appealed for Drezga in the malpractice case. Judd v. 
Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 103 P.3d 135. Drezga received "appointed counsel" (Mr. Burke) 
for this declaratory judgment case. Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44, 122 P.3d 533. Court 
appointed counsel was not involved in the malpractice appeal. 
Also, Judd asserts that when TDC offered in 2007 to refund Drezga's policy 
premium, Drezga's "appointed counsel refused the offer as untimely." (Judd Br. p. 5 Tf 
18.) In fact, the correspondence from Drezga's appointed counsel, declining that offer, 
makes no mention of untimeliness. (R. 2982-2983, Appx. 1 of this reply brief.) 
1 
Drezga ys Factual Statements 
Drezga (via appointed counsel) accurately observes that the record on appeal lacks 
certain factual information. Such missing information includes whether Drezga 
intentionally failed to cooperate in the defense of the Judd malpractice claim and became 
aware of this declaratory judgment lawsuit. (Drezga Br. p. 3.) Elsewhere, counsel 
speculates on a variety of issues. 
TDC agrees that such facts have not been established and also asserts that such 
speculative claims were not properly preserved for this Court's consideration on appeal. 
They have not been established because sufficient formal discovery has not been done in 
this declaratory judgment lawsuit. The only case management order for this lawsuit was 
entered in April 2007. That order set deadlines for litigating the Judd-Drezga summary 
judgment motion, but did not set a discovery schedule. (R. 1900-1908, 1918-1921, Appx. 
2 of this reply brief.) The lack of sufficient discovery, particularly with respect to TDC's 
non-cooperation claim, is one prominent feature of this appeal. (Opening Br, p. 39-43.) 
In contrast, there is evidence properly before the Court that TDC would not have 
1
 Reference to appointed counsel, Mr. Burke, is not meant to suggest any disrespect or 
criticism of him (or of Judd's counsel). Instead, it is used to simply clarify that the 
positions posed in Drezga's brief may not actually be Drezga's views, as he is absent 
from the case. 
2 It is simply speculation to assert that a) reversal of this case would likely leave Drezga 
without means to satisfy the judgment; b) Drezga relied upon coverage by TDC; c) 
Drezga may have misunderstood the insurance application questions; d) Drezga did not 
have sufficient command of the English language when he completed the application; e) 
TDC may have insured Drezga even if he had not misrepresented his malpractice history; 
f) Drezga had no reason to seek other insurance; g) Drezga practiced medicine believing 
that TDC would protect his interests and those of his injured patients; and h) Judd relied 
2 
issued Drezga a policy had he truthfully completed the application. (Opening Br. Zeiter 
Affidavit Appx. 6 ). Similarly, TDC refutes any inference in Drezga's brief that TDC 
did not propose tendering a refund of Drezga's premiums to Drezga's court appointed 
counsel, who declined receiving them on Drezga's behalf (See e.g. Drezga B. at pp 4 
("TDC has failed to repay the premiums...")). 
Also prominent are questions of law regarding just what facts must be proven if 
TDC is permitted to proceed with its non-cooperation claim, its rescission claim, or both. 
(E.g., Opening Br. pp. 7-8, 23-29, 42-45.) Because this appeal arises from the May 2008 
order of summary judgment against TDC, factual inferences and disputes related to that 
order should be indulged in favor of TDC. See, e.g., Harris v. Albrecht, 2004 UT 13 f^ 2, 
86 P.2d 728, 729.3 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
TDC seeks judicial relief from any obligation to defend or indemnify Drezga, 
based upon contractual rights that are plainly expressed in Drezga's malpractice policy 
and in his application for that policy. While it is understandable that appellee Judd 
(whose child was injured by Drezga) opposes TDC's claims for relief, Judd's tragedy 
does not empower her to re-write Drezga's malpractice policy. Nor is it sufficient for her 
to essentially suggest that this Court affirm this case due to sympathy for her child or 
on the fact that Drezga was covered by malpractice insurance (Drezga Br. pp. 2, 4, 5-6) 
Where TDC appeals the denial of summary judgment in its favor, the factual inferences 
and presumptions run in Judd's and Drezga's favor. 
3 
because she (incorrectly) believes TDC was responsible for a tragedy (Judd Br. pp 33-34). 
Instead, the evidence properly preserved for this Court's consideration, plus the 
reasonable inferences or presumptions attendant thereto, demonstrate that Drezga, and not 
TDC, was solely responsible for Judd's unfortunate outcome. Indeed, had Drezga 
truthfully completed TDC's insurance application, TDC would not have insured him 
(opening Br. Zeiter Aff. Appx. 6), he would have thus likely been denied hospital 
privileges, and Judd would have had a different, competent physician, deliver her child -
presumably without injury. 
As for Drezga, it is properly presumed at this stage that he misrepresented his 
malpractice history when he applied for that policy. (Judd Br. p. 9, quoting May 9, 2008 
judgment.) Additionally, because he disappeared, Drezga provided absolutely no 
cooperation in his own defense and the malpractice suit was tried to an "empty chair," 
with predictable result. Ironically, Drezga now assails TDC for asserting its plainly-
stated contractual rights "against the empty chair of its insured." (Drezga Br. p. 8.) 
Drezga warranted that the statements in his policy application were true. He was 
warned that he could lose coverage if he provided false information, and he promised, 
under the policy, to cooperate in defense of any claim against him. Drezga committed 
fraud in his application, and he breached his warranty and broke his promise. Under these 
circumstances Drezga is owed nothing by TDC, and Judd cannot claim greater rights, 
under the policy, than Drezga. 
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REPLY POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S "CANCELLATION WAIVED 
RESCISSION" HOLDING SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. The Trial Court's Reasoning is Clear but Incorrect. 
JuddJoined by Drezga, asserts that the trial court's "cancellation waived 
rescission" reasoning, in its May 9, 2008 judgment, "is clear.55 (Judd Br. p. 9; Drezga Br. 
p. 5 n.l.) However, the trial court's reasoning is also incorrect, particularly in light of the 
rule that on motion for summary judgment factual inferences must be drawn in favor of 
TDC, the opposing party on this issue. {See Harris, supra). The "totality of 
circumstances55 does not support Judd5s contention that TDC intentionally relinquished or 
waived its prerogative to seek rescission of Drezga5s policy. 
It is true that in June 2000, TDC took actions consistent with cancellation. 
However, TDC5s July 2000 amended complaint is styled "Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief and Rescission" (emphasis added). (Opening Br. pp. 11, 22, & Appx. 
7.) In it, TDC alleges facts upon which the policy should be declared void and invokes 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(10), which preserves the right to rescind a policy that is 
procured by fraud or misrepresentation. Thus the totality of TDC5s actions, upon 
discovering Drezga5s misrepresentations, squarely contradicts the trial court's conclusion 
that actions consistent with cancellation operated to waive TDC5s requested alternative or 
additional remedy of rescission. 
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B. Cancellation and Rescission Are Both Permissible. 
Judd and Drezga invite this Court to construe the policy's "rescind or cancel" 
language against TDC, to make those remedies mutually exclusive. (Judd Br. p. 10-12.) 
They seemingly invoke the rule that ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed in 
favor of coverage. E.g., LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Company, 765 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1988). However, they did not argue to the trial court, nor did the trial court hold, 
that the "rescind or cancel" language is ambiguous. Judd and Drezga also inconsistently 
argue that a "plain reading of the policy" supports their position. (Judd Br. p. 15.) In 
short, they make no coherent, preserved-for-appeal argument that the policy is 
ambiguous. 
Were that argument properly before this Court, "it is axiomatic that a contract 
should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which 
terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life, 765 
P.2d at 858. As explained in TDC's opening brief, the language in Drezga's policy 
regarding rescission and cancellation can readily be harmonized. Doing so permits TDC, 
or a similarly-situated insurer, to prospectively cancel a policy fox future claims or risks, 
while also moving for judicial rescission, which acts both prospectively and retroactively. 
(Opening Br. p. 23-29.) Such harmonizing construction of the policy is reasonable and 
avoids ambiguity. 
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C. The TDC Policy is "Voidable." 
Quoting Continental Ins, Co. v. Kingston, 2005 UT App 233, 114 P.3d 1158, Judd 
and Drezga stress that Drezga's TDC policy is "merely voidable, not void." (Judd Br. p. 
14.) That is a distinction without a difference. TDC understands the term "voidable" to 
mean that the policy can be declared void, retroactive to its inception date, if TDC proves 
its allegations of fraud or material misrepresentation. 
Judd and Drezga imply that TDC unilaterally "could have chosen to rescind" the 
policy once it discovered Drezga's misrepresentation. (Id.) Such choice would have been 
imprudent. TDC seeks rescission under common law, as permitted in Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-21-303(10) (West 2008) (Opening Br. Appx. 1). Because rescission has retroactive 
effect it is typically sought via the courts. See L. R. Russ and T. F. Segalla, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE 3d § 31:65 (Thomson/West 2005) (cancellation is ordinarily accomplished by 
the parties; rescission is ordered in the first instance by the court). 
TDC's non-cooperation claim was already before the trial court when TDC 
discovered Drezga's misrepresentation. An attempt to unilaterally rescind the policy 
would have been an improper attempt to "end run" the court's authority. TDC acted 
prudently by adding its rescission claim to its already-pending non-cooperation claim. 
Recognizing that its claims might be denied, TDC took other actions to protect its 
interests so far as possible and reasonable, without judicial permission. One such action 
was to fund Drezga's defense in the malpractice case. Also, TDC prospectively cancelled 
Drezga's policy, under statutory procedures. Those actions were not intended to be, and 
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should not be construed as, intentional relinquishment of TDC's right to seek retroactive 
rescission. TDC ought not be punished for exercising its lesser remedy of cancellation, 
and for attempting to defend Drezga while concurrently seeking a judicial declaration that 
his policy is void. 
D. Premium Refund is Not a Prerequisite to Judicial Rescission. 
Judd criticizes TDC for not offering to refund Drezga's policy premium until 
2007, (Judd Br. p. 16-17) Drezga also criticizes TDC for not refunding the premiums 
(Drezga Br. pp. 4, 10.) even though his appointed counsel refused them, (see Appx.l) 
Had TDC unilaterally declared Drezga's policy void, refused to defend the malpractice 
case, and retained his premium, (without later inquiring if Drezga's counsel would accept 
a refund of the same), Judd and Drezga would have a powerful argument. But rather than 
act in such imprudent manner, TDC funded Drezga's defense while simultaneously 
seeking a judicial declaration that the policy is void. As explained in TDC's opening 
brief, under these circumstances TDC's failure to more promptly offer a premium refund 
should not bar its claim for rescission. (Opening Br. p. 29-31.) 
E. Denial of Motion to Amend is Not an Issue on Appeal. 
Judd and Drezga ask this Court to affirm the trial court's denial, in its May 2008 
judgment, of TDC's motion to file a second amended complaint. (Judd Br. p. 20.) That 
motion was motivated in part by TDC's desire to avoid confusion about use of the terms 
"cancel" and "rescind" in its July 2000 (first) amended complaint. (R. 2443, in Opening 
Br. Appx. 9.) TDC was imprecise in its use of both terms, as litigants and courts often 
8 
are. COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 30.3.4 But TDC's first amended complaint plainly 
requests declaratory relief and rescission, and alleges legitimate grounds for rescission. 
Because the second amended complaint should not be needed for TDC to maintain its 
rescission claim, TDC does not burden this Court with the question whether the court 
erred in disallowing it. 
REPLY POINT TWO 
TDC's RESCISSION RIGHT WAS NOT ABROGATED BY 
JUDD's INTEREST AS AN INNOCENT THIRD PARTY. 
Judd suggests that "public policy55 supports "abrogation55 of TDC's rescission 
right, based upon her interest as an innocent third party. (Judd Br. p. 24-25, 33.)5 
However, not only should "public policy" instead speak against an applicant lying on an 
insurance form, but Judd has also not answered TDC's arguments that such "abrogation95 
holdings are supported by /eg/^to/ve/y-established public policy, and that no such support 
exists in this case. (Opening Br. p. 31-34). Two provisions of Utah's insurance code, 
wherein third party-based abrogation might logically appear, make no such provision. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-2M05, 31A-21-303 (West 2008) (Opening Br. p. 34 & 
Appx. 1). 
Similarly, Appellee Judd appears to use the terms "rescission,5' "revocation," and 
"recession" interchangeably in her brief. (Judd. Br. pp. 8, 12, 15, 18.) The trial court's 
September-October 2000 ruling possibly also used the terms "rescission" and 
"cancellation" as if they were the same. (Judd Br. p. 20-21.) 
5Drezga has not expressly joined this point of Judd's brief. Not knowing whether Drezga 
intends to do so, TDC replies to Judd's point as if she were the only one making it. 
9 
Judd has not identified, nor has TDC located, any published case wherein the 
abrogation of an insurer's rescission right has been judicially imposed without legislative 
support. Ingrassia v. Medical Malpractice Ins. Ass'n, 161 A.D.2d 685, 555 N.Y.S.2d 876 
(N.Y. App. 2d Div. 1990), cited by Judd (Judd Br. p. 24), is also cited by TDC because in 
that case rescission was seemingly abrogated based upon legislative policy. (Opening Br. 
p. 37.) The "abrogation for third party interests" holding of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 
v. O'Conner, 8 N.Y.2d 359, 170 N.E.2d 681, 207 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1960) 
(Judd Br. p. 24-25), appears similarly grounded upon New York State's "Assigned Risk 
Plan" legislation for automobile insurance. 
Again in the context of automobile liability, this Court has demonstrated that it 
will follow the legislature's lead in deciding coverage issues: 
The Utah legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme 
mandating minimum liability coverage for motor vehicles. . . . This 
legislative enactment reflects a public policy requiring vehicle owners to 
carry a minimum level of liability coverage to protect innocent victims of 
automobile accidents. 
Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69 ^ 42, 98 P.3d 28, 36 (emphasis added; statutory citation 
omitted). Utah's legislature has not mandated liability coverage for medical malpractice. 
Lacking legislative support, Judd's intonation of "public policy," in support of the trial 
court's "abrogation" ruling, therefore rings hollow. 
REPLY POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S MAY 2008 JUDGMENT ERRONEOUSLY 
DISMISSED TDC'S "NON-COOPERATION" CLAIM 
As argued in its opening brief, TDC has a trial-worthy claim of non-cooperation by 
10 
Drezga. The trial court erred in its May 2008 judgment in effectively dismissing this 
claim. (Opening Br. p. 39-43.) 
In response, Judd asserts that "[tjhere are no witnesses that have come forward55 to 
prove that Drezga's non-cooperation was intentional. (Judd Br. p. 27.) She implies that 
if this suit were remanded for proceedings on non-cooperation she would win summary 
judgment on this claim. Therefore, she argues "it would be a waste of time" to order such 
remand. (Id. p. 27-28; see also id. p. 30-31.) Similarly, Drezga argues that there is 
"absolutely no evidence in the record" to support TDC's non-cooperation claim under the 
"intentional non-cooperation" standard adopted by the trial court.6 (Drezga Br. p. 7.) 
Those arguments lack merit. Judd and Drezga are essentially asking this Court to 
grant summary judgment, in their favor, on the non-cooperation claim, without affording 
TDC sufficient discovery. They made no such motion in the trial court. Instead, Judd 
labeled the non-cooperation claim "tangential" in the papers supporting her motion for 
summary judgment, in which Drezga joined. (Opening Br. p. 40.) Therefore, Judd and 
Drezga have not preserved for appeal a motion to summarily dismiss TDC's non-
cooperation claim. 
Nor can they seek "appellate summary judgment" as an alternative ground to 
affirm the trial court's May 2008 judgment. A judgment may be affirmed on alternative 
6As argued in its opening brief (p. 43-45), and reiterated in Reply Point Four of this brief, 
infra, the trial court adopted an incorrect "intentional and willful" standard to prove a 
non-cooperation claim. Accordingly, TDC disputes the argument in Judd's brief that 
TDC has ignored that requirement (Judd Br. At 27). If this Court agrees with TDC that 
such standard is incorrect, it should remand this case for entry of summary judgment for 
11 
grounds, "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent in the record." 
Madsen v. Washington Mutual Bank FSB, 2008 UT 69 ^ 26, 199 P.3d 898, 905 (quoting 
authority; emphasis added). There is no record support for Judd's and Drezga's assertion 
that TDC cannot prove intentional non-cooperation. This is because, as observed earlier 
(See Reply to Appellees' Statement of Facts), formal discovery to bring such evidence 
into the record has not occurred. 
This Court is not well-positioned now to receive and assess non-record evidence 
that may support or defeat TDC's non-cooperation claim. Therefore, Judd's and Drezga's 
argument for "appellate summary judgment" on this claim should be denied. 
REPLY POINT FOUR 
THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE STANDARDS 
FOR PROVING NON-COOPERATION. 
A. No "Intentional and Willful" Requirement 
TDC should not be required to prove that Drezga "intentionally and willfully" 
breached his policy's cooperation requirement. It should suffice that Drezga's 
cooperation was diligently sought, yet not achieved. (Opening Br. p. 43-45.) Judd 
responds that other jurisdictions require that non-cooperation be intentional in order to 
justify relief to the non-breaching insurer. (Judd Br. p. 26-27.) 
Judd relies on Cincinnati Ins. Company v. Irvin, 19 F.Supp.2d 906 (S.D. Ind. 
1998), a case persuasive to the trial court. (Judd Br. p. 25-27; R. 512-513, in Opening Br. 
Appx. 8.) The facts in Irvin suggest that the court therein reached a proper result, but not 
TDC on its non-cooperation claim. 
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because of its "intentional non-cooperation" reasoning. The non-cooperating alleged 
tortfeaser in Irvin was not the policy holder of the subject automobile liability policy. 
Instead, she was a permissive user of the automobile and an insured party under the 
policy's terms. 19 F.Supp.2d at 907-908. She disappeared after the underlying accident, 
and the insurance company invoked the cooperation requirement to deny coverage. 
Had the court in Irvin granted relief to the insurer, based upon the permissive 
user's disappearance, such result would have been manifestly unfair to the policy holder. 
There is no indication that the policy holder was un-cooperative with the liability defense 
necessitated by the permissive user's accident and no indication that the policy holder had 
any means of securing the permissive user's cooperation. The insurer's non-cooperation 
claim, if granted, would have left the policy holder uninsured for the permissive user's 
tort and disappearance. 
No such unfairness is risked in this case for Drezga is both the tortfeaser and the 
policy holder. As the TDC policy holder he had clear notice of the cooperation 
requirement. As tortfeaser and policy holder he had control over his own cooperation. 
He plainly did not cooperate in his defense, and under the plain policy language such non-
cooperation excuses TDC from defending or indemnifying him. 
Drezga broadly argues that the purposes of liability insurance include the 
protection of "injured third parties." (Drezga Br. p. 8.) As with Judd, he disregards the 
n 
Drezga also seemingly broadly equates an insurer's duty to defend with its duty to 
indemnify (Drezga Br. p. 7-8), even though the former is broader than the latter. E.g., 
Fire Ins. Exchange v. Estate o/Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48 U 22, 27 P.3d 555, 560. 
13 
specific TDC policy language in this case which unequivocally states that in event of a 
claim Drezga must cooperate in his defense or coverage will be lost. (Opening Br. pp. 42, 
44; R. 2047-2048, in Opening Br. Appx. 3.) Judd and Drezga have not offered evidence 
to excuse Drezga's breach of that requirement, but only speculation that he may have 
vanished for reasons other than Judd's malpractice claim. Judd cannot claim greater 
rights under the TDC policy than Drezga can. Thomas v. Otis, 199 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 
1961), affdsum nom Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 306 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 
1962); Goodner v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 440 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1968). And Drezga cannot logically claim greater rights under the policy than any he 
would have had by cooperating in his malpractice defense. But, by glossing Drezga's 
non-cooperation with an "intent requirement," that is effectively what Judd and Drezga 
urge. Such gloss, unsupported by the policy and unsupported by contract principles, 
should be rejected.8 
B. Reasonable Diligence. 
TDC argues that as a matter of law it exercised reasonable diligence in its efforts 
to locate Drezga and to secure his cooperation in defense of the malpractice claim. 
o 
Judd and Drezga are mistaken in their assertion that there is no evidence to prove that 
Drezga "intentionally and willfully" failed to cooperate. Given the circumstances of 
Athan's birth and injury, there is at least a fair inference that Drezga certainly had reason 
to believe that a malpractice claim was likely. Judd reports that he disappeared from Utah 
within two months of Athan's birth. (Judd Br. p. 2.) Viewed in a light favorable to TDC, 
that timing raises an inference that Drezga disappeared with the intent to avoid Judd's 
claim. Also, the "no knowledge of claim" rule espoused by Judd and Drezga seems 
unfairly broad. If Drezga had not known of Judd's claim, but disappeared to avoid 
consequences of other misconduct (for example, committing a crime), it is hard to believe 
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(Opening Br. p. 46-50.) Alternatively, TDC requests remand with clarification of what 
standard applies for proving such reasonable diligence. (Id. p. 50-52.) 
Judd and Drezga do not respond to TDC's arguments regarding diligence. "[T]he 
brief of the appellee must contain the contentions and reasons of the appellee with respect 
to the issues presented in the opposing brief." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89 ^ 22, 16 
P.3d 540, 545. Therefore, this Court should conclude that Judd and Drezga have either 
waived or defaulted their opportunity to argue on appeal the "diligence55 element of 
TDC's non-cooperation claim. TDC refers the Court to its opening brief on the 
"diligence" question. 
C. Prejudice. 
Based upon the language of Drezga's policy, TDC should not bear the burden of 
proving prejudice caused by Drezga's non-cooperation. TDC recognizes that, in the 
context of automobile liability insurance, Utah case law is to the contrary. (Opening Br. 
p. 44.) TDC asks this Court to distinguish or overrule such authority based upon the 
language of Drezga's policy, the lack of a statutory requirement for such malpractice 
insurance, and the prejudice that naturally arises when a civil defendant is absent without 
explanation. (Opening Br. p. 52-56, citing authority.) Counsel who defended Drezga in 
the malpractice suit submitted an affidavit confirming this problem. "[I]t would be 
extremely difficult and prejudicial to the defense of a case such as this to go to trial with 
an absentee defendant/physician." (Aff. of David Slagle, R. 460-462, Appx. 3 of this 
that such disappearance would not violate the cooperation requirement. 
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reply brief.) See also Berry v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 508 P.2d 436, 438 (Or. 1973) (en 
banc); Glens Falls Indemn. Corp. v. Keliher, 187 A. 473, 476-477 (N.H. 1936) (both 
noting prejudice due to absent defendant). 
Judd acknowledges the paradox faced by TDC if it is ordered to prove prejudice 
caused by Drezga's non-cooperation. Without Drezga's presence TDC cannot establish 
what Drezga would have said or done to yield a defense-favorable result in the 
malpractice case. (Judd Br. p. 29.) Partially quoting a passage from Irvin supra, Judd 
nevertheless insists that TDC bears this impossible burden. (Judd Br. p. 29.) The 
complete passage in Irvin suggests legislative policy as the basis to so allocate the burden: 
An insurer facing the defense of a claim with an absent defendant might 
reasonably ask how it is supposed to prove that it could have had a better 
result in a trial if it had been able to locate a key witness whom it never 
manages to locate. As discussed below, decisions from other jurisdictions 
offer additional guidance as to when a failure to cooperate might cause 
prejudice, but they do not necessarily offer much solace to an insurer that 
never locates the insured and is never able to offer proof of the testimony 
the insured could have offered if she had appeared for trial. In addition, it 
is important to keep in mind, as most state courts have when dealing with 
similar problems, that the automobile liability insurance policy is not a 
purely private contract. Such insurance is required by law to protect the 
interests of innocent third parties injured by the negligence of the insured 
person. Thus, in the absence of collusion, most courts put the burden of 
proof, and thus the risk of uncertainty, on the insurer rather thatn on the 
person injured by the insured's negligence. 
19 F.Supp.2d at 914 (the above-emphasized portion is not quoted in Judd Br,, p. 29.) The 
above-emphasized and underlined language reveals that the "proof of prejudice" burden 
in non-cooperation claims is assigned to the insurer via legislative policy, namely in the 
context of automobile insurance, the context presented in Irvin. Utah has no such 
16 
legislative policy for medical malpractice insurance.9 
Medical Assurance Co. v. Weinberger, 2007 WL 2915650 (N.D. Indiana, 
magistrate's order) (Judd Br. p. 28), affd, 572 F.Supp.2d 995 (N.D. Indiana 2008) does 
not compel assignment of the proof-of-prejudice burden to TDC. Weinberger is a 
medical malpractice case also featuring a vanished defendant. The magistrate's order 
cited by Judd, as well as the district judge's affirming order, cites the Indiana proof-of-
prejudice rule from Irvin, supra. 2007 WL 2915650 *5; 572 F.Supp.2d at 1000. That 
rule, as already explained, arose in an automobile liability case, with legislative support 
that is lacking in this case. 
The Weinberger orders do not quote the particular "cooperation requirement" 
language in the vanished physician's malpractice policy.10 As previously explained, 
Drezga's policy plainly identifies cooperation as a requirement that the insured must 
satisfy. The policy also expressly states that the purpose of the requirement is to avoid 
prejudice. (Opening Br. p. 54-55.) The risk of unexcused non-cooperation therefore 
properly rests upon the non-cooperating insured (Drezga) and not upon TDC. 
9The "collusion" concern in Irvin is that an insured might collude with a plaintiff to 
support the plaintiffs claim. 19 F.Supp.2d at 914. By statute, Utah forbids an insurer 
from colluding with its insured to avoid coverage. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-202 (West 
2008) (Opening Br. Appx. 1). Neither type of collusion has been alleged in this case. 
10The magistrate's opinion in Weinberger gives only passing reference to the cooperation 
requirement in that case: "This provision states that Medical Assurance has no duty to 
defend if the insured fails to 'cooperate with the company . . . in making settlement [and] 
in the conduct of suits.'" 2007 WL 2915650 p. 4 (ellipsis and brackets in court opinion). 
The magistrate's partial quotation of analogous policy language in Weinberger does not 
clearly reveal whether Indiana courts would similarly construe or re-write cooperation 
language such as that in Drezga's TDC policy. 
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Assuming that the burden of proving prejudice rests with TDC, Judd argues that 
TDC cannot possibly carry that burden because of the outcome of the malpractice case. 
The malpractice court directed a verdict for Judd on the issue of Drezga's negligence. On 
appeal, the absent Drezga did not challenge that directed verdict. Judd v. Drezga, 2004 
UT 91 ^ 8, 103 P.3d 135, 137. According to Judd, that negligence verdict now bars proof 
that Drezga's non-cooperation helped cause that verdict. (Judd Br. p. 29-30.) 
If accepted, that circular argument would unjustifiably reward Drezga for causing 
the very prejudice that the cooperation requirement is expressly intended to prevent. 
(Opening Br. p. 54.) If accepted, that argument would grant to Drezga (and thus to Judd) 
greater recovery rights under the policy than would exist had Drezga complied with the 
cooperation requirement. If accepted, that argument would effectively eliminate the 
cooperation requirement from Drezga's policy. 
That argument should be rejected and this Court should enforce the plain language 
of Drezga's policy. TDC diligently tried, without success, to secure Drezga's cooperation 
in defense of the malpractice suit. Absent proof of a legitimate excuse for Drezga's non-
cooperation, TDC should be relieved of any further obligations on his behalf 
REPLY POINT FIVE 
JUDD's CHALLENGE TO THE TIMELINESS OF 
TDC's CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE HEARD ON APPEAL 
Judd argues that TDC may have filed its claims too late. (Judd Br. p. 22-23.) 
Judd's "timeliness" arguments were never advanced in the trial court and lack record 
support. Therefore, they should not be heard on appeal. 
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A. Rescission Claim. 
With respect to rescission, Judd acknowledges that "[t]he record does not disclose 
when TDC obtained information about Dr. Drezga's malpractice history.55 (Judd Br. p. 
22.) TDC's amended complaint, adding the rescission claim, was filed on July 11, 2000. 
Earlier, on June 19, 2000, TDC had added rescission to its summary judgment motion and 
had filed its "Notice Seeking Termination of Coverage.55 (Opening Br. p. 10-11.) TDC5s 
awareness of the grounds for rescission arose on or before June 9, 2000, when one of its 
officers, Todd Zeiter, executed his affidavit. (Opening Br. Appx. 6.) 
Under Judd5s new theory, TDC5s rescission claim was not timely if TDC did not 
give Drezga notice thereof within sixty days after discovering that he had misrepresented 
his claims history. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(5) (West 2008) (Opening Br. 
Appx. 1). That theory is problematic in light of Drezga5 s disappearance and unavailability 
to receive such notice. Regardless, Judd5s "untimely rescission55 theory cannot be decided 
on appeal because it was not raised in the trial court and the record contains insufficient 
undisputed facts to otherwise decide it. 
B. Non-Cooperation Claim. 
With respect to non-cooperation, Judd asserts that "[tjhere is no question as to the 
timing of TDC5s knowledge of Dr. Drezga5s alleged non-cooperation.55 TDC "knew of 
Dr. Drezga5s disappearance in 1997." Therefore, Judd argues that TDC5s original April 
2000 complaint, raising only the non-cooperation claim, was untimely. (Judd Br. p. 22-
23.) 
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If that argument had been properly preserved for appeal it would likewise have to 
be rejected. Drezga's non-cooperation was an ongoing problem that could have ended 
had he re-appeared and helped to defend the malpractice lawsuit. He could have done so 
any time from his 1997 disappearance until December 2000, when the malpractice lawsuit 
went to trial. (Opening Br. p. 12.) His non-cooperation was effectively incomplete until 
the adverse verdict was entered in his absence. 
TDC notified Drezga of its non-cooperation claim when, with leave of court, it 
served its original complaint by publication. (R. 44-46, Opening Br. Appx. 4.) That 
service was accomplished in approximately August 1999, well before the malpractice 
case went to trial (R. 703-716), and thus well before Drezga's non-cooperation was 
complete. It therefore appears impossible to prove that TDC's non-cooperation claim 
was filed too late. But if Judd insists upon attempting such proof, such attempt cannot 
begin on appeal. 
REPLY POINT SIX 
TDC SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO PAY THE FEES 
OF DREZGA'S COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL 
Drezga asks this Court to affirm the trial court's April 2003 ruling that TDC pay 
appointed counsel's fees. He essentially attempts to re-write that ruling by asserting that 
"affirmance . . . would result in payments to Dr. Drezga's counsel only after the 
successful defense of Dr. Drezga's interests." (Drezga Br. p. 9; emphasis added.) The 
trial court's April 2003 ruling is not contingent upon Drezga prevailing against TDC. 
Instead, the court flatly ruled that "Defendant the Doctor's Company, consistent with 
20 
prior order of the court, pay the attorneys fees of Paul Burke for his representation of 
Defendant Drezga.55 (R. 1506, Appx. 5 of this reply brief.) The "prior order55— either a 
March 2003 Minute Entry, or a May 2001 Ruling (R. 1024-1025, 1496, also in Appx. 5) 
— also states no such contingency. 
By adding the contingency that fee payment by TDC depends upon Drezga5s 
"successful defense55 in this declaratory judgment lawsuit, Drezga effectively invites this 
Court to deem him a "prevailing party,55 and to order payment of counsel's fees on that 
basis. But the general principle in Utah and the American tradition is that payment of 
prevailing counsel's fees, by the losing party to a lawsuit, is not permitted without 
statutory or contractual authority. (Opening Br. p. 59-60.) Drezga identifies no such 
authority, nor has he argued for any exception to this "principle55 that each party bears its 
own attorney fees. Therefore, even if Drezga is a "prevailing party,55 TDC should not be 
ordered to pay his attorney fees. 
Regarding "up-front55 payment of appointed counsel's fees, Drezga disagrees with 
TDC5s reliance upon Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 
590 (Texas 1996) (Drezga Br. p. 9-10.) Simply put, Mayfield appears to be the only 
known case that is reasonably on-point for this issue. TDC has located no contrary case 
law, and Drezga cites none. Thus while Texas law does not control Utah courts, Mayfield 
has persuasive value as apparently the only published case to address this issue. 
Drezga's counsel also minimizes the concern that Drezga himself might not accept 
counsel whose up-front fees are paid by his adversary. (Drezga Br. p. 8-9.) Again, 
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Drezga's disappearance clouds this issue because "[a] lawyer shall not accept 
compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless . . . the client 
gives informed consent. . ." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(f) See also Comment [11] to 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.8 (acknowledging that third-party payers frequently have 
interests in limiting litigation costs). Thus while appointed counsel must exercise his own 
independent judgment, Utah R. Prof. Conduct 5.4(c )the reality is that there is tension, if 
not an outright conflict, between Drezga and his court-appointed counsel.11 Because of 
that tension, acknowledged in the Mayfield decision, TDC should not be ordered to pay 
opposing counsel's fees. 
REPLY POINT SEVEN 
ISSUES NOT PROPERLY ADVANCED BY APPELLEES 
SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL 
Judd's and Drezga's briefs contain certain allusions that could conceivably be 
regarded as issues on appeal. However, their briefs include no statement of issues, nor 
any representation that such issues have been properly preserved on appeal by 
presentation to the trial court., as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A ) 
Utah R. App. P. 24(c) directs TDC, on the one hand, to "answer[] any new matter 
set forth in the opposing brief." On the other hand, TDC has the prerogative to ignore any 
new issues raised in Judd's and Drezga's briefs, with the expectation that this Court will 
do the same. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89 % 24, 16 P.3d 540, 545-546 (citing cases). 
However, if TDC "answers" such new issues they may be treated as though properly 
11
 See supra footnote 1, p. 2) 
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presented on appeal. Id. (citing Rome v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 81 Ill.App.3d 776, 
36 111. Dec. 894, 401 N.E.2d 1032, 1034-35 (1980)). 
Given the casual manner in which Judd and Drezga present certain "alluded-to 
issues," TDC asks this Court, in accord with Brown v. Glover, to disregard them because 
they were not properly raised in the trial court, and therefore TDC has not had sufficient 
opportunity to answer them. Such issues and speculative claims include whether: (a) 
Drezga's policy was delivered to him with the policy application attached (Judd. Br. p. 4 
n.l); (b) TDC adequately investigated Drezga's claims history before issuing the policy 
(Id. p. 23-24, 33); (c) TDC breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Drezga (Id. 
p. 30); (d) Drezga can satisfy Judd's judgment without TDC's indemnification (Drezga 
Br. p. 2); (e) Drezga relied upon TDC coverage and believed his injured patients would 
be protected by TDC (Id. pp. 4, 6); (f) insurance companies, (instead of applicants 
themselves), are in the best position to investigate the applicants, and presumably the 
accuracy of the applicant's own representations (Id. p. 7); (g) Drezga misunderstood the 
application and lacked sufficient command of the English language (Id. pp. 5-6); (h) TDC 
would have issued a policy if Drezga had been truthful (Id. p. 6); (i) Judd relied on the 
fact that Drezga was covered by malpractice insurance (Id. p. 6); (j) (in contrast to 
automobile insurers) medical malpractice insurance companies, [who specifically tie 
coverage to truthful applications by licensed professionals not obligated by state law to 
carry such coverage], have an obligation to screen applicants (Id. p. 7); and (k) Utah law 
should provide incentive for insurers to screen professional liability insurance applicants 
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(Id.) Judd and Drezga have not sufficiently "set forth, " or "raised" those issues, as 
contemplated by the Court's rules or case law. 
The argument that TDC should have investigated Drezga's claims history is 
especially problematic from a procedural standpoint. Judd's own counsel executed an 
affidavit, in opposition to TDC's February 2000 summary judgment motion, in which he 
asserted that discovery was needed regarding that issue. (Aff. of James McConkie, R. 
424-429, Tff 7-8, 11-12, copied in Appx. 4 of this reply brief.) No such discovery has 
occurred. Therefore, there is no basis for an appellate ruling on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to suggestions by Judd and Drezga, this case is not about whether Judd's 
child deserves sympathy, whether TDC's litigation "punishes" him, or whether Drezga or 
Judd fairly relied upon TDC's coverage. Instead, this case is about Drezga 
misrepresenting material facts in his insurance application, and then failing, without 
excuse, to cooperate in the defense of the Judd malpractice claim. Drezga, not TDC, 
both directly and indirectly, injured Judd and caused this litigation. If issues of "public 
policy" are triggered, they should serve to punish individuals who defraud others in the 
formation of a contract. As such, TDC should have no obligation to indemnify Drezga. 
For these reasons, and for the reasons in TDC's opening brief, the trial court's May 
2008 judgment, its September-October 2000 ruling, and its order that TDC pay the fees 
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for Drezga's court-appointed attorney in this lawsuit should all be reversed. The case 
should be remanded for appropriate trial court proceedings, as requested by TDC. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ _ day of April, 2009. 
STUCKI STEELE PIA ANDERSON 
& 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
Attorneys for Appellant 
The Doctors Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jj^»day of April, 2009 I caused to be delivered by the 
method indicated below, a true and correct copy of this APPELLANT'S REPLY 
BRIEF to the following: 
. VIA FACSIMILE 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Kenneth D. Lougee 
David Biggs 
STEELE & BIGGS 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Attorneys for Heidi Judd, personally as the 
natural parent and guardian of A than 
Montgomery 
VIA FACSIMILE 
"VIA HAND DELIVERY 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Paul C. Burke 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for G. Gregory Drezga, M.D. 
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August 13,2007 
Paul Burke 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 S. State, #1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: TDC v. G. Gregory Drezga 
Our File No.: 99-1'36D 
Dear Mr. Burke: 
As you know, defendants Judd and Montgomery have raised the issue that TDC has yet 
to return unearned premiums to defendant Drezga as part of their rescission of the contract. 
Because no Answer has been filed by you to our Amended Complaint please advise if you are 
willing or have the authority from Dr. Drezga to hold or access those funds on Dr. Drezga's 
behalf. 
Very truly yours, 
Ef^PERSON RENCH1 & OWENS 
cJL^> 
Jaryl L Rencher 
JLR/DCE:pm 
cc: Patricia Shuler Schimbor, Esq, 
Devin O'Brien, Esq. 
nmo^ 
R A Y Q U I I S J I M E Y & N E B E K E R 
Paul C. Burke 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO Box 45385 
Sell Uke City Ufoh 
84)45-0365 
35 South State Strew 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
8 4 U 1 
801 532-1500 FIRM 
801 323-3303 DIRECT 
80) 532-7543 FAX 
pt>urke@rqn,com 
wwyv.rqn.com 
August 28,2007 
VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Jaryl L. Rencher, Esq, 
EPPERSON & REJNCHER, P.C 
Crandall Building, Fifth Floor 
10 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: The Doctors' Company v, G. Gregory Drezga, et al 
Dear Jaryl; 
I am in receipt of your letter dated August 13,2007, At this 
juncture, neither have I authority from Dr. Drezga nor am I -willing on his 
behalf to accept the return of any premiums that your client might wish to 
tender as part of an effort to rescind its contract of insurance with 
Dr. Drezga, 
Lam also -writing to confirm that you have graciously agreed to 
extend ffte time for Dr. Drezga to respond to your client's pending 
complaint and motions, including the motion to amend the complaint. I 
understand that you will provide me with notice of such time when you 
wish to receive responses from Dr. Drezga to these filings. 
You are welcome to call me if you wish to discuss this matter. 
Sincerely yours, 
l U I ^ E Y &NEBEKER P.C. 
Paul C. Burke 
PCB/glw 
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EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff The Doctor's Company 
10 West 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801)983-9800 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTORS' COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
G GREGORY DREZGA, MD; and HEIDI ; 
J. JUDD, personally and as the natural ] 
parent and guardian of ATHAN ] 
MONTGOMERY, for and on behalf of ) 
ATHAN MONTGOMERY, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) (PROPOSED) CASE MANAGEMENT 
) ORDER 
1 Civil No 990904527 
Judge Timothy Hansen 
On March 14, 2007, Plaintiff by and through their attorney of record. Jaryl L. Renchei of 
Epperson & Rencher and Defendants Judd/Montgomery by and through their attorneys of record, 
Fames W McConloe of Parker & McConloe. a practice group of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahlei, 
ippeared before the Honorable Timothy Hansen upon an Ordei to Show Cause as to why this 
nattei should not be dismissed Based upon the file and the representations of counsel the Court 
Q7HAR29 PK 2 ' 12 
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essentially ordered that the parties submit a Case Management Order within 30 days. Based 
upon the foregoing Plaintiff hereby files with the Court a proposed Case Management Order: 
1. Plaintiff the Doctor's Company represents that on or about November 28, 2003 it 
filed a Motion to Serve Amended Complaint on Court Appointed Counsel, or in the 
Alternative Renew Motion for Leave to Renew Default Judgment. Among other things 
Plaintiff intends to request a default judgment. 
2. Defendant Athan Montgomery filed a Summary Judgment Motion on October 
3, 2003 which is pending. The Plaintiff has filed a response. 
3. The Honorable Judge Leslie Lewis previously entered an Order on March 24, 
2004 stating that "The summary judgment will be heard after a determination by the Court of 
Appeals...Counsel will then contact this Court for a setting on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and any other issues." See Exhibit A. "Docket" (emphasis added). The Court should 
schedule a hearing on Defendant Athan Montgomery's Motion for Summary Judgment at some 
time after Plaintiff The Doctor's Company's Motion to Serve Amended Complaint on Court 
Appointed Counsel, or in the Alternative Renewed Motion for Leave to Renew Default Judgment 
has been heard. 
4. hi part given the fact that 3 years has lapsed since Defendant Montgomery filed 
the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has requested additional time to file a supplemental 
brief in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff also now wishes to 
\aro 
submit additional argument and bases for relief It is anticipated that Defendant will object to 
this intent. Further Defendants Judd and Montgomery have objected to the filing of 
supplemental briefs on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and believe the same purpose 
could be accomplished through letters to the Court. Assuming this Court denies Defendant's 
Motion for default Plaintiff should be granted 10 days thereafter to supplement or otherwise 
respond to Defendant Montgomery's Motion for Summary Judgment and to file any additional 
argument. Defendant Montgomery will thereafter have the time to reply pursuant to this Court's 
rule and a hearing will be held thereafter. 
5. If after the dispositive Motions have been decided, further discovery is necessary, 
the Court should then consider a more expansive Case Management Order. 
DATED this day of March 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
n rn 
Fr', » r.? 
JAMES W. MCCONKIE, 2156 
BRADLEY H. PARKER, 2519 
PARKER & MCCONKIE, a practice group of 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 578-3250 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTOR'S COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, M.D.; HEIDI 
JUDD personally and as the natural parent 
and guardian of ATHAN MONTGOMERY 
for and on behalf of ATHAN 
MONTGOMERY, 
Defendants. 
CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER 
Civil No. 990904527 
Judged-
&JPCW 
On March 14, 2007 Plaintiff The Doctor's Company (TDC) by and through their attorney 
of record, Jaryl Rencher of Epperson & Rencher and Defendants Heidi Judd and Athan 
Montgomery, by and tlirough their attorneys of record, James W. McConkie and Bradley H. 
Parker of Parker and McConkie, a practice group of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, appeared 
before the Honorable Timothy Hansen upon an Order to Show Cause as to why this matter 
should not be dismissed. Based upon the file and the representations of counsel the Court 
ordered that the parties submit a Case Management Order withm 30 days. Based upon the 
forgoing, Defendants Heidi Judd and Athan Montgomery hereby file with the court a proposed 
Case Management Order: 
1. This matter was filed on March 27, 1999 and has been pending for eight years. 
The case has been up to the Utah Supreme Court twice. 
2. Plaintiff The Doctor's Company represents that on November 28, 2003 it filed a 
Motion to Serve Amended Complaint on Court Appointed Counsel, or in the 
Alternative Renew Motion for Leave to Renew Default Judgment. 
3. Defendant G. Gregory Drezga will have until April 9, 2007 to respond to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Serve Complaint on Court Appointed Counsel, or in the 
Alternative Renew Motion for Leave to Renew Default Judgment. Plaintiff The 
Doctor's Company will have five days within which to respond. 
4. Defendants Heidi Judd and Athan Montgomery filed a Summary Judgment 
Motion on October 3, 2003 which is pending. The Plaintiff has filed a response. 
5. Pursuant to this Honorable Court's ruling, the Defendants' Summary Judgment 
Motion should be heard forthwith. The Honorable Judge Leslie Lewis previously 
entered an order on March 24, 2004 stating that "The summary judgment will be 
heard after a determination by the Court of Appeals ... Counsel will then contact 
this court for a setting on the motion for summary judgment and any other issues." 
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(See Docket page 16, attached hereto as Exhibit A). However, in the event that 
this honorable court allows sendee of Defendant G. Gregory Drezga, in fairness, 
said Defendant should also have an opportunity to respond to Defendants Heidi 
Judd and Athan Montgomerys' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the 
court should schedule a hearing on Defendants Heidi Judd and Athan 
Montgomerys' Motion for Summary Judgment at some time after Plaintiff The 
Doctor's Company's Motion to Serve Amended Complaint on Court Appointed 
Counsel, or in the Alternative Renewed Motion for Leave to Renew Default 
Judgment has been heard and decided. 
6. If after Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion has been decided, further 
discovery is necessary, the court should then consider a more expansive case 
management order. 
7. Counsel for Defendant G. Gregory Drezga does not oppose this proposed Case 
Management Order. Counsel for Plaintiff The Doctor's Company does oppose 
this proposed Case Management Order. 
3 
\Af\U 
DATED this 3 ? day of A ^ / T - , 2007 
PARKER & McCONKIE, a practice group of 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
James W. McConkie 
Attorney for Defendants 
CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER 
The Court, having reviewed the foregoing Proposed Case Management Order, and for 
?ood cause appearing hereby orders as follows: 
1. Defendant G. Gregory Drezga shall have until April 9, 2007 to respond to Plaintiffs 
VEotion to Serve Complaint on Court Appointed Counsel, or in the Alternative Renew Motion for 
_,eave to Renew Default Judgment. Plaintiff The Doctor's Company shall have five days within 
vhich to respond. 
2. After Plaintiffs Motion to Serve Complaint on Court Appointed Counsel, or in the 
Uternative Renew Motion for Leave to Renew Default Judgment has been heard and decided, 
)efendants Heidi Judd and Athan Montgomerys' Motion for Summary Judgment shall be 
cheduled forthwith for a hearing. However, Defendant G. Gregory Drezga will be given ample 
pportunity to respond to said motion before it is heard. 
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3. If after Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion has been decided, further discovery is 
necessary, the court shall then eater a more expansive case management order. 
DATED this day of , 2007. 
Honorable Timothy Hansen 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the r^tf day of IYI()A//l , 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Jaryl Rencher 
Epperson & Rencher 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Paul Burke 
Ray, Quinney & Nebekker 
36 South State Street #1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
-Or ™ S(Mm^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTORS' COMPANY, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 990904527 
vs. 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, MD; and HEIDI : 
J . JUDD, p e r s o n a l l y and as t h e 
n a t u r a l parent and guardian of 
ATHEN MONTGOMERY, for and on 
b e h a l f of ATHEN MONTGOMERY, 
Defendants . 
This ma t t e r comes be fo re the Court i n connect ion w i t h t h e proposed 
Case Management Orders f i l e d by the p l a i n t i f f , The D o c t o r ' s Company, and 
defendants Heidi Judd and Athan Montgomery ("Judd d e f e n d a n t s ' ' ) . The 
p l a i n t i f f has f i l e d an Objec t ion to the Judd defendants 7 proposed Order 
and has a l so reques ted o r a l argument. Since the p a r t i e s have a d e q u a t e l y 
s t a t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s and the i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d are not d i s p o s i t i v e , t h e 
Court dec l i ne s t o schedule t h i s m a t t e r ' f o r h e a r i n g . 
As a b r i e f p rocedura l h i s t o r y , the Court no t e s t h a t Judge Lewis, t h e 
Judge o r i g i n a l l y ass igned t o t h i s mat te r , i s s u e d a N o t i c e for an Order 
t o Show Cause hear ing t o be he ld on March 1, 2 0 07. On t h a t d a t e , counse l 
appeared in f ron t of Judge Hanson, who was t e m p o r a r i l y a s s i g n e d t o t h i s 
c a s e . According to Judge Hanson 's Minutes, Mr. Burke, who was p r e v i o u s l y 
appoin ted t o r ep re sen t defendant Dr. Drezga, was not p r e s e n t . At t he 
DOCTORS7 COMPANY V. DREZGA PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
conclusion of the hearing, Judge Hanson directed counsel to submit a 
stipulated scheduling order, including a list of the pending Motions. 
Instead of submitting a stipulated order, the plaintiff and the Judd 
defendants have submitted dual versions of proposed Case Management 
Orders. In reviewing these competing Orders, the Court notes that the 
principal difference between them is the inclusion, in the plaintiff's 
proposed Order, of supplemental briefing on the Judd defendants' pending 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Judd defendants7 Order provides that 
this Motion will be heard forthwith. There is also an issue as to 
whether defendant Dr. Drezga can respond to the pending Motions prior to 
his counsel, Mr. Burke, entering a formal appearance in this case. 
After considering the parties7 respective Orders, the Court 
determines that given the span of nearly four years since some of the 
pending Motions were filed, supplemental briefing is appropriate. 
Further, the Court notes that in her May 16, 2006, Court's Ruling, Judge 
Lewis indicated that Mr. Burke is relieved of any further obligation to 
locate and establish communication with defendant Dr. Drezga. Judge 
Lewis further ruled that Mr. Burke is authorized to proceed in providing 
Dr. Drezga the full scope of legal representation. In light of Judge 
Lewis7 Court's Ruling, it is unnecessary for Mr. Burke to enter a formal 
appearance. Rather, Mr. Burke may proceed to file oppositions or 
supplemental briefs, as the case may be, with respect to the pending 
Motions. \*\\C 
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Accordingly, after comparing the plaintiff's and the Judd 
defendants' proposed Orders, the Court concludes that the plaintiff's 
Order better reflects the ruling of the Court, particularly with respect 
to the issue of supplemental briefing. The Court will therefore enter 
the plaintiff's proposed Case Management Order, with the following 
additions and clarifications: Mr. Burke will have until May 10, 2007, 
to respond to the plaintiff's Motion to Serve Complaint on Court 
Appointed Counsel, or in the Alternative Renew Motion for Leave to Renew 
Default Judgement. The plaintiff will have five days after the filing 
of Mr. Burke's response to file a final reply. Either side may submit 
the plaintiff's Motion for decision. 
Assuming that the Court denies the plaintiff's request for default 
judgment, the Court will proceed to consider the Judd defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Mr. Burke will have ten days from the date of the 
Court's ruling concerning the plaintiff's Motion to respond to the Judd 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff may also file a 
supplemental opposition to# the Judd defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment within that same time frame. The Judd defendants may then file 
a supplemental reply (or replies) and submit their Motion for Summary 
Judgment for decision. 
v < \ ^ 
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The Court has entered the plaintiff's proposed Case Management Order 
on a date contemporaneous with this Minute Entry decision. 
Dated this ^X J) day of April, 2007. 
W 
DISTRI 
\ ^ \ 
APPENDIX 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTORS' COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID W. SLAGLE 
vs. 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, M.D. and HEIDI 
J. JUDD, personally and as the natural parent 
and guardian of ATHEN MONTGOMERY, 
for and on behalf of ATHEN 
MONTGOMERY, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
David W. Slagle, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. That he is 
employed as a shareholder in the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau and has been so 
employed for the past 32 years. 
2. That he was retained by The Doctors' Company to represent Dr. Gregory Drezga 
in the lawsuit entitled Heidi J. Judd personally and as the natural parent and guardian ofAthan 
Montgomery for and on behalf of Athan Montgomery, Plaintiffs, v. Gregory Drezga, M.D. and 
Tooele Valley Regional Medical Center, Defendants, Civil No. 980905603. That at the time he 
was retained by The Doctors' Company he was informed by Janet Burrows, Claim Representative ( EXHIBIT W \ **_s— I 
Civil No. 990904527 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
for The Doctors' Company assigned to this case, that Dr. Drezga had left Tooele, Utah, had left 
the State of Utah, and The Doctors' Company did not know his whereabouts and had not been 
able to locate him. This Affiant was also informed, at that time, that The Doctors' Company was 
defending Dr. Drezga under a "Reservation of Rights" due to the fact that Dr. Drezga had not 
been located and The Doctors' Company might terminate its defense of Dr. Drezga pursuant to 
certain terms of its insurance policy. 
3. After being retained by The Doctors' Company, this Affiant sent correspondence 
to Dr. Drezga at his last known address, and said correspondence was returned by the post office 
as being unclaimed with no forwarding address. This Affiant was informed by someone at either 
Tooele Valley Regional Hospital or Dr. Drezga's former office that Dr. Drezga had left the 
country and could not be located. 
4. It is the opinion of this Affiant, based on long years of experience and practice in 
defending physicians who are involved in medical malpractice cases, that it is extremely difficult to 
defend a case where the defendant physician is not present at trial. This Affiant has defended at 
least two cases through trial where the defendant physician was deceased at the time of trial. In 
both cases, the trial was attended by the decedent's widow and, in one case, this Affiant also had 
the decedent's office manager present at the trial. In the professional opinion of this Affiant, it 
would be extremely difficult and prejudicial to the defense of a case such as this to go to trial with 
an absentee defendant/physician. In this Affiant's opinion, it would be much more prejudicial to 
the defense to defend a case such as the underlying case against Dr. Drezga in a situation where 
the defendant/physician was "missing" rather than a situation where the defendant/physician was 
-2-
deceased Further, in the opinion of this Affiant, based on many years of practice and experience, 
it would be very prejudicial to go to trial in a malpractice case where the defendant/physician had 
never communicated with defense counsel and defense counsel had no explanation as to why 
defendant/physician had left the jurisdiction. 
DATED this //>> day of July, 2000. 
A Z& 
DAVID W. SLAGLE 
Attorney for G. Gregory Drezga, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /& day of July, 2000. 
My Commission Expires: 
NO* 
Mark 
V PUBLIC 
,c Norton 
Macs, 11th Fir. lOkXDliantr1 
Gall Lake Cit\ Utah 84111 
FIDA^y[5W2r1^T,,ss,G^, «- x p i r B S 
February 11, 200? 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
-3-
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APPENDIX 4 
JAMES W. McCONKIE, A215 6 
BRADLEY H. PARKER, A2519 
PARKER & MCCONKIE 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
HEIDI JUDD PERSONALLY AND AS 
THE NATURAL GUARDIAN OF ATHAN MONTGOMERY 
4001 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 115 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE: (801) 264-1950 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTOR'S COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs , 
vs. 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, M.D.; 
HEIDI JUDD personally and as 
the natural parent and 
guardian of ATHAN MONTGOMERY 
for and on behalf of ATHAN j 
MONTGOMERY. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W. McCONKIE 
Civil No. 990904527 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
James W. McConkie, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows; 
^ M 
n T -,w counsel for defendants Heidi J Judd and Athan 
Montgomery 
2. Plaintiff, The Doctor's Company, has filed an untimely 
summai y judgn lent motion for the reason that neither side has had 
an opportunity to conduct discovery. Th^ ill ah Vulfy of iv i I 
Procedure 56(f) provides that "Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing motj on th,il h: cannot foi reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opp or if ion i he C >url uo L >' i ei list the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositi oris to be taken or discovery to be had or make such order 
as is just." 
3. Defendants Judd and Montgomery are unable to present 
essential facts t:o oppose the a] ] egati ons :i n p] a inti f f ' s mot ion 
for summary judgment. 
! l'"l a i nt J J J li.u n 1 j >j (-'SeuLo.J day t vidence to support the 
proposition that defendant Dr. Gregory Drezga left this 
jui isdiction to avoid a law suit, Plaintiff has also not 
presented any evidence i ; oh'»w tint M PJ I 'nv i, uiiMit ujiiu.on 
uncooperative. 
) 
i 
5. Further discovery is needed to find persons who 
associated with Dr. Drezga who may have information about why he 
left the State of Utah. At this point in time, there is strong 
evidence that Dr. Drezga left the jurisdiction for personal 
reasons. Kaye Pratt signed an affidavit stating that she was the 
office manager at Dr. Drezga's office located in Tooele, Utah and 
worked for him starting sometime in June or July of 1996 and left 
his employment sometime in June or July 1997. She characterized 
her relationship as a professional one (office manager) and as a 
friend. She stated that she was not only familiar with Dr. 
Drezga's medical practice but some of his personal affairs as 
well. Affiant Pratt states that Dr. Drezga was receiving calls 
from creditors and that his patient load was decreasing. She 
also observed that he was anxious about family matters involving 
his wife and son who were living out of state. For these and 
other reasons specifically set forth in her affidavit, Affiant 
Pratt concluded that, uDr. Drezga never mentioned to me that he 
as worried about a law suit of any kind or that he had intentions 
of leaving town due to fear of a law suit." 
H^U 
6. Further/ discovery is needed to investigate the truth or 
fa] si ty of tl le represent:at:i c «ns aboi it pr:i : r 2 a L / J S ui ts which may 
have been made by Dr. Drezga when he filled out hid s application 
wit.)* The I)''i-I or ' s-i Company . bor example/ defendants should be 
given the opportunity to determine whether or not the pri or 
malpractice claims mentioned in The National Practictioner' s Data 
Bank are true. 
7 Further discovery is needed on the part of the defendant 
hi t" 11 h'- tJj^  Jf-po^j L i on,1 <">! t 11 r ^* u ui TIL*-- ImcLji r > \ >iupctny who have 
knowledge about why The Doctor's Company failed to take any 
ac11 oi :i Dii 1:1: Ie c] a :i i i: i i :i i 11i ] ?mgust: 10 , 2 999 . This inf ormation is 
particularly pertinent because The Doctor's Company knew about 
the filing or the underlying lawsuit in this matter as early as 
September 16, 1977 and failed to take ac 1: :i on f• : •: : ] ] mont):is 
Furthermore, The Doctor's Company failed to assert the defense 
that f'i DTP: r-i l*no n\\ \\\r m M 1 cat ion mil "i 1 June I'1, „,( n 1 
year and nine months after The Doctor's Company was given notice. 
8. Depositions are necessary to explore the reasons why The 
Doctor's Compa.ny did not discover the alleged misrepresen 1:a12 ons 
on Dr. Drezga's application. 
[ 
9. Further discovery is needed on the part of the 
defendants to take depositions to discover the reasons, if any, 
why The Doctor's Company failed to take any action to deny the 
claim, until August 10, 1999. 
10. Further discovery is needed on the part of the 
defendants to discover the amount of premiums paid to The 
Doctor's Company by Dr. Drezga between the time of his initial 
insurance until time of termination of coverage. 
11. Further discovery is needed on the part of the 
defendants to determine when The Doctor's Company received 
information regardincj Dr. Drezga's alleged misrepresentation. 
12. Further discovery is needed on the part of the 
defendants to determine the availability of information to The 
Doctor's Company which would have disclosed any 
misrepresentations on Dr. Drezga's application. 
13. Further discovery is needed on the part of the 
defendants to determine if The Doctor's Company would have 
insured Dr. Drezga even in light of the alleged 
misrepresentations about his prior malpractice claims. 
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] 4 . A l l of t h e s e i s s u e s a r e p e r t i n e n t and r e l e v a n t t o t h e 
l e g a l a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d by t l le pla:i ntd f f :i nvo.1 vi rig wi l e t h e r o r no t 
The D o c t o r ' s Company can r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y c a n c e l Dr . D r e z g a ' s 
po l i i cy aft^'T a rlavm Iu,r. hi-cn j i l t d and whe the r o r n o t The 
D o c t o r ' s Company i s e s t o p p e d from c a n c e l i n g t h e p o l i c y beca i i se 
t o o ninch La line has p a s t . 
SIGNED AND SWORN TO t h i s 
r7ti 
d a y of - J i J 3 A y 2 0-0 0 . 
^Ttu^^i 
JAMES W. McCONKIE 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this _ _/L day of 
Ta ; Jj^Bdr- 2 0 0 0 
LISA ANN HOLLADAY 
Notary Public 
Stole of Ufah 
My Comm. Expires Mar26,2032 
4001 S700ESute 115 SLCUT 84107 
•if m w 
Wile 15 SLCUT 84107 f 
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APPENDIX 5 
JAMES W. McCONKJE, A2156 
BRADLEY H. PARKER, A2519 
PARKER & MCCONKIE 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
HEIDI JUDD PERSONALLY AND AS 
THE NATURAL GUARDIAN OF ATHAN MONTGOMERY 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8411 1 
TELEPHONE: f80j . 2M-1c;v:> 
FILES? DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR - 8 2003 
^IrTxLAKE COUNTS 
Deputy Clerk 
- ' S n 1- I \ L.pVf\ L W \U U 1 V I J., 
IN 7 * VL DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE nonr>ir •-•  COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ORDER APPOIN i i M , COUNSEL 
LOR DEFENDANT DREZGA 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, M.D.; HEIDI 
JUDD personally and as the natural parent 
and guardian of ATHAN MONTGOMERY 
for and on behalf of ATHAN 
MONTGOMERY. 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 990904527 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
This present matter concerning the appointment of counsel to represent Defendant 
Drezga consistent with the prior order of this court came on regularly before the court for 
hearing on the 24th day March, 2003. Plaintiff The Doctor's Company was represented by Jaryl 
Rencher. Defendant Montgomery was represented by James W. McConkie and Bradley H. 
Parker. 
Attorney Rencher, on behalf of his client, Defendant The Doctors' Company, noted for 
the record, as he previously briefed and argued m prior hearings before the court, his objection to 
the appointment of any counsel, but indicated no additional personal objection to the 
appointment of attorney Paul Burke Attorney Rencher represented to the court that The 
Doctor's Company had communicated to him that The Doctor's Company would not pay the 
attorney's fees of the court appointed counsel even if ordered by the court to do so and attorney 
Rencher requested that any appointed counsel be so informed 
Having heard the arguments and representations of counsel, upon the pleadings on file 
herein, upon and consistenl with the past orders of the court and being fully informed of the 
premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
1 Paul Burke, of the law firm of Ray, Qumney and Nebeker be and hereby is 
appointed as counsel for Defendant Drezga, and that 
2. Defendant The Doctor's Company, consistent with prior order of the court, pay 
the attorneys fees of Paul Burke for his representation of Defendant Drezga 
Jary] Rencher '
 t , 
u T/m>y d 
CliRIIJ ItATii Ob SLRUCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that J caused to be hand-delivered a true and coriect copy oi the 
fui egonig this
 L ) ul Mf/Uij/1 _ , JlKi^, to-
Jaryl Rencher 
VaunB Hall 
EPPERSON &, RENCHER 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Sail Lake City, UT 84101-1566 
Telephone: (801) 983-9800 
Facsimile (801) 983-9808 
WmMfilftktlilCf) 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOCTORS' COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
G. GREGORY DREZGA MD Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
Case No: 990904527 MI 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: March 24, 2 003 
Clerk: chells 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JARYL L RENCHER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRADLEY H PARKER 
JAMES W MCCONKIE 
Video 
HEARING 
TIME: 10:08 AM The issue of apointment of counsel is before the 
Court. 
The Court orders Mr Paul Burke is appointed to represent Dr G 
Gregory Drega to be paid by the Doctors' Co. 
Mr Rencher objects to the payments from the Doctors' Co. 
The Courts order will stand. 
If necessary sometime in the future, and Mr Rencher believes the 
fees have become excessive, he may brief the issue and request a 
hearing. 
Mr McConkie will prepare the order from this hearing. 
Page 1 (last) W» 
FILES P P ^ T T ^ T (^niiigsj 
Third juo.uiai LML- .ict 
K:.V WIZZ\ 
ay rmVWMJtvrL, 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTORS1 COMPANY, : COURT'S RULING 
Plaintiff, S CASE NO. 990904527 
vs. : 
6. GREGORY DREZGA, MD; and HEIDI: 
J. JUDD, personally and as the 
natural parent and guardian of : 
ATHEN MONTGOMERY, for and on 
behalf of ATHEN MONTGOMERY, : 
Defendants. : 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed pursuant 
-o Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration in connection 
tfith the plaintiff's Motion for Clarification or in the 
alternative, Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal 
Pursuant to Rule 4(e) (the plaintiff has actually filed a Motion 
:or Order Nunc Pro Tunc; Motion for Clarification of Court's Ruling 
>n the Issue of Service in Light of Attached Affidavit and Motion 
?or Rule 56(d) Clarification). The plaintiff has also filed a 
^leading seeking Clarification and Correction of Plaintiff's 
:emorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Having 
eviewed the moving and responding memoranda with respect to the 
ending Motions, the Court rules as stated herein. 
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The essence of the plaintiff's Motions is that the Court's 
March 8, 2 001, Court's Ruling, and subsequent Clarification of 
Court's Ruling, entered on March 13, 2 001, are inconsistent with 
the Court's Order of July 8, 1999. The July 8, 1999, Order 
allowed the plaintiff to accomplish service of process by 
publication alone• This is incorrect. 
The March 8 and March 13, 2 001, Court's Rulings dealt with an 
entirely different issue: whether the plaintiff could obtain 
default judgment based solely on service by publication. In the 
recent Court's Rulings, the Court relied on Guenther v. Guenther, 
749 P.2d 628, 629 (Utah 1988), which reiterated that "publication 
of summons accompanied by mailed notice sent to a last known 
address" met the constitutional standard for an "in personam 
judgment." (Emphasis added). Furthermore, while Rule 4 may no 
longer require both publication and mailed notice to the last known 
address, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that both are 
required for an in personam judgment.1 This Court did not 
previously require both publication and mailed notice because this 
was the first time that the issue of a default judgment had arisen 
1
 The Court cannot locate any rulings from Utah's appellate courts subsequent to 
Guenther which indicate that publication alone is sufficient for obtaining an in personam 
judgment. Therefore, the requirement of both publication and mailing set forth in Guenther is still 
the binding law in Utah. 
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in this context and the Court had not previously considered that 
Guenther specifically requires that both be accomplished for the 
constitutional standard to be met. 
It now appears from the Affidavit of Janice Harrison that the 
plaintiff did in fact accomplish both publication and mailed notice 
to Dr. Drezga's last known address. Nevertheless, the issue still 
remains concerning whether this Court can enter default judgment 
when it has already determined that the plaintiff is not entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law. As stated in the March 8, 
2001, Court's Ruling, the plaintiff was granted leave to renew its 
request for default judgment. However, when the plaintiff chooses 
to renew this motion, it must address whether it is substantively 
and procedurally appropriate for one to seek default judgment after 
denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The plaintiff has also inquired about the finality of the 
Court's previous two Court's Rulings. A final determination of the 
plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Renew Service by Publication, and 
for Entry of Judgment has been postponed pending the plaintiff's 
clarification of the issue identified above and for retention of an 
independent counsel for defendant Drezga (see discussion below). 
The March 8, 2 001, Court's Ruling was an Order denying only the 
defendant's Motion that the Court reconsider its Memorandum 
Decision, dated September 15, 2 000. 
u 
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Finally, the plaintiff seeks an order "nunc pro tunc11, 
essentially allowing service on defendant Drezga to be accomplished 
by mailing a copy of the Summons to Attorney David W. Slagle. It 
is not clear what purpose such an order would serve since Mr. 
Slagle has definitively stated that he does not now nor has he ever 
represented defendant Drezga in this matter and is unwilling to 
accept service on defendant Drezga's behalf. However, this brings 
the Court to another important matter, the defendants1 Motion to 
Appoint Counsel. Although this Motion has not been submitted for 
decision under Rule 4-501, the Motion has been fully briefed and is 
now ripe for decision. After reviewing the moving and responding 
memoranda with respect to this Motion, the Court agrees with the 
defendants that defendant Drezga does not have adequate 
representation in this matter. In addition, defendant Drezga, as 
the insured, is in an adversarial position with the plaintiff, his 
insurer. Under the Utah law alluded to by the defendants in their 
moving papers, the plaintiff is required to retain independent 
counsel to represent defendant Drezga in this matter. New counsel 
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must be identified and on-board within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Court's Ruling. ,'V^-
Dated this day of May, 208 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
\v*y. X ^ f ^f,s* 
